Deontic logic and the axoim of necessity: the consequences of a misinterpretation by Fleischhacker, L.E. & Kuper, J.
J. Value Inquiry 16:67-74 (1982) 0022-5363/82/0161-0067 $01.20. 
9 1982 Martinus NijhoffPublishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherlands. 
DEONTIC LOGIC AND THE AXOIM OF NECESSITY: THE 
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Usually ~ systems of deontic logic differ from systems of modal logic by the 
invalidation of the equivalent of the axiom of necessity: Lp  D p.2 As a 
reason for this invalidation the following argument is given: "When some 
state of affairs is necessary it must be real, whereas if it is obligatory it need 
not be real. ''3 This argument presupposes that the concept of "state of 
affairs" is used in the same sense - at least basically - in both cases. The 
common feature of these uses of "state of affairs" is their theoretical 
character: a proposition is taken to express the content of a possible object 
of knowledge precisely in this respect, that it can be known to be so or not 
to be so. The "0' operator in deontic logic has to transform this 
meoretical interpretation i to a practical one, so that it can be decided that 
it ought to be so or not to be so. The problem arises that the practical value 
of this transformed proposition does not depend on the theoretical truth of 
the original. In other words, there is no reason why, for example, a 
contradiction cannot be obligatory, whereas a counterfactual proposition 
can. This is a consequence of the presupposition that the transfer from the 
theoretical to the practical point of view can be expressed by an operation 
within a formal system. Even in von Wright's logics of change and action 
this presupposition is not satisfactorily explained. 4 Our thesis is that it is 
not justified in any respect hat is applicable to the rejection of the axiom 
Op D p in deontic logic? Therefore an interpretation of the formalisms 
now in use to represent modal logic can be given that fits perfectly the idea 
of deontic logic. This also brings along a more accurate modal 
interpretation of these formalisms. 
Asserting a state of affairs in a judgment amounts to asserting its 
existence. 6 Therefore the concept of "state of affairs" must be defined 
without including this existence, otherwise judgment and assertion would 
amount o nothing. A state of affairs is accordingly to be considered as the 
abstract "so and so",  taken apart from the judgment " it  is so and so".  
This is reflected in propositional ogic by the distinction between a 
proposition and its assertion, r This assertion is usually and as a matter of 
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course taken to represent theoretical judgment: " it  is so and so",  but for a 
deontic logic this is a rather awkward starting point. All the difficulties of 
the interpretation of formalisms proposed for deontic logic originate in this 
thoughtless presupposition. Is a tautology obligatory? How to express a 
conditional obligation? How is the relation between pure propositional nd 
deontical formulas to be understood in general? 8 When we try to solve 
these problems we get entangled in mixtures of theoretical and practical 
judgment hat we feel to be very artificial: Why don't we start with 
practical judgment in the first place'? 
If from the beginning we interpret assertion as representing practical 
judgment instead of theoretical judgment: "so and so ought" instead of 
"so and so is", the first striking fact is that the counterpart of the axiom of 
necessity becomes valid. Indeed obligation of so and so ought to entail so 
and so, which is nowthe meaning of FOp Dp already, whereas it had to be 
expressed by l- O(Op D p) in the usual interpretation, in which 1- qo meant 
'qo is' instead of 'cO ought'. 1~ So the difference in formal representation 
between modal and deontic logic diappears, which is completely in 
accordance with our experience that consequence is not different in 
thought and in action. But there is something else we can learn from this. 
Obligation, according to our interpretation, represents within the 
formalism what assertion represents for the formalism. 11 Is this also true 
for modal logic? If it were, assertion should have to represent necessity 
there, more precisely the necessity expressed in a theoretical judgment. The 
"rule of necessity" included in modal systems also points in this direction 
and can be considered then as a modal supplement of the deduction 
theorem for material implication. But before this track is followed we have 
to clarify the meaning of necessity in this context, for several confusions 
are imminent here. What is not meant by necessity here is (1) necessity in 
the interconnection of the components of a state of affairs, or (2) the 
necessity of its existence. Neither of these senses of necessity do we 
express when we assert hat "the state of affairs is so and so" because this 
state of affairs may be contingent both in its nature and in its existence. 
What is asserted is the necessity that the state of affairs is so and so just in 
so far as and in the sense in which the judgment is true. In the case of a 
purely logical judgment, this may correspond to logical necessity. In the 
case of a mathematical judgment it corresponds to necessity within a 
mathematical framework. For an empirical judgment it corresponds to the 
irrevocability of a fact, and for a metaphysical judgment it might even 
correspond to absolute necessity. But it is only the logical side of the matter 
with which we are concerned here. In the light of these considerations the 
formalisms of modal logic appear as attempts to include part of the 
epitheory 12 of the propositional calculus in the formalism itself. This is in 
accordance with C.I. Lewis' interpretation f strict implication as a kind of 
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entailment. This point of view also provides an explanation for some 
model-theoretical features of modal logic. 13 
Returning to deontic logic, the question arises as to how to interpret the 
transition from necessity to obligation, not only now for an operator 
within the formalism, but for the fundamental epitheoretical predicate '4of 
the whole system and its representation within the formalism. Our 
interpretation of the assertion in a theoretical sense was connected with the 
necessity included in the truth is of the asserted proposition. The subjective 
act of theoretical judgment measures itself by its objective contents. In a 
practical judgment on the contrary, the contents are measured by the 
subject with respect to its own standards. This results in assent or rejection. 
But assent is obligation only in so far as and in the sense in which the 
practical judgment is "'true" i.e., a subject has obliged itself by it. We 
consider a theoretical judgment to be true generally if it expresses a state of 
affairs that is real, precisely in the sense meant. Accordingly, a practical 
judgment may be considered as true if it expresses a state of affairs that is 
willed in the intended sense. This intended act of will can be an individual 
assent or decision, a decision or law of a community, or even a divine 
commandment. 
So modal and deontic logic are already different on the level of 
propositional calculus. What is assertion in the "theoretical" 
interpretation, is assent in the "practical" interpretation. Reflected within 
the formalism, this becomes an operator of necessity, on one hand, and an 
operator of obligation, on the other. The formalism is the same, the 
interpretations are different. 
Does this solve the problems? 
The first and foremost obligation is integrity of a subject in its acts of 
will, for this is a necessary condition for the possibility of obligation as 
such. So what is consistency in the theoretical interpretation of the logical 
formalism, is integrity in the practical interpretation. Logical consequence, 
then, should be thought of in terms like: what follows by integrity. Now 
the deontic counterparts of tautologies and in general logical truths follow 
by integrity alone; in that sense they can obviously be considered as 
obligatory. This explains the validity of the rule of necessity (if I- p then t- 
Op) in deontic logic. Even if "assertion" is not conceived as purely logical, 
but, e.g., with respect o an axiomatic basis, this rule is understandable 
from our point of view, for "assertion" in that case expresses commitment 
to the fundamental norms expressed in the axioms. In this context integrity 
could even be understood as commitment of a subject o itself, which is 
again a necessary condition for all commitment. '6 
Another problem is constituted by sentences uch as " I  shall take an 
umbrella if it rains", in which - as it is said - fact and decision seem to be 
intermixed. But "it  rains" is not necessarily a fact at all; actually now that 
70 
I am writing this it is not. 17 
The same connection of characteristics an be the content of assertion 
and of assent. The reason for the first can be that it is a fact, but this can 
never be the reason for the second. This is the intuition behind the rejection 
of the axiom of necessity for deontic logic, but this intuition is brought in 
at too late a stage of the development of deontic logic. It should have been 
taken into consideration atthe very outset, for the deontic interpretation f
the propositional calculus. The difference between fact and action is 
irrelevant for formal deontic logic. What is relevant is the difference 
between a "so and so" as a possible content of knowledge and the same 
"so and so" as a possible content of the will. 
Anderson (1966) gives an interpretation f the systems of deontic logic as 
they are usually put forward, in terms of modal ogic. This interpretation is 
very revealing for the status of these systems, in which the axiom of 
necessity has no deontic counterpart. Anderson defines premissibility as 
the possibility that something oes unpunished: Pp = D M (p" ~ S) where 
S is a contingent proposition. It was already observed by von Wright 18 that 
this presupposes that evil is always punished. He proposes as a solution to 
interpret S as liability to punishment, which sounds rather like sweeping 
the question under the carpet. The obvious answer is that evil ought always 
to be punished, but thereby the reduction of deontic to modal logic is 
destroyed, because Pp = P (p, ~ S) does not constitute a definition of P. 
Now ~ S can be regarded as a positive proposition, say IV. 19 Then M)p" 
W) represents he relative possibility o fp  with respect o some proposition 
that may be regarded as characterizing some "possible world". We could 
define this relative possibility as follows: MWP = M(p'W) and 
accordingly a relative necessity L WP = W"-3p. This relative modal system 
is isomorphic to Anderson's interpretation of deontic logic. Of course a 
corresponding relative deontic system is also possible. This clarifies the 
origin of the difference between modal and deontic logic that is usually 
postulated. The "'absolute" systems of modal logic have always been 
compared with the "relative" systems of deontic logic. It is clear that, for 
relative necessity, the axiom of necessity does not hold, for substitution of W 
for p would give 1- W and so W would not be contingent and L W would 
become absolute necessity again. When obligation is interpreted as 
"prescription by some moral code", the notion of relative obligation 
results and it follows from the contingency of this code that it need not be 
universally assented to. Nevertheless, the assent o an obligation implies 
the assent o its content, which is exactly the content of Op D P. So I- Op 
Dp is based on integrity alone, but I- OwP~ p is based on assent o the 
moral code expressed by W, so this latter form is more properly expressed 
by W I- OwP Dp in which shape it is valid again. 
Even though the preceding arguments are rather obvious, the reader 
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might feel unsatisfied by the fact that the cleft between ethics and reality 
cannot be expressed by simply deleting an axiom. The reason for this is that 
the cleft is so deep that both sides cannot be united into one system of 
formal logic. Nevertheless, decisions and obligations can be realized, just 
as assertions can be verified. This can be a complicated process in which 
theoretical and practical judgment and consequence will be involved and 
from which formal logic is obtained by abstraction, either in the theoretical 
or in the practical direction. This unidirectional abstraction gives our 
system of logic its univocal and mathematizable character. The so-called 
cleft between ethics and reality is unfathomable only as long as we do not 
reflect on the abstractions we make. 
The subjects traditionally studied with the aid of deontic logic - 
consistency of ethical systems, conditional norm, commitment, he logic of 
law, etc. - can also be studied from the point of view presented here. It 
looks like a great advantage that from this point of view the well-developed 
formalisms of modal logic are available for this purpose. Only the 
transition from decision to realization falls ouside the scope of this 
interpretation. It is however questionable whether this transition can at all 
be investigated by means of logical formalisms. 
NOTES 
4. 
5. 
Cf. Anderson (1966), p. 147 ff.; von Wright (1951), (1971a), p. 105; Hughes and 
Cresswell (1968), p. 301; Hintikka (1971), p. 59; P. Lorenzen (1969). 
Cf., e.g., Hughes and Cresswell (1968), p. 31. We stick to H & C's notation. 
Cf. Anderson (1966), p. 168; von Wright (1963), p. 109, 110. See also Copi and Gould 
(1967), p. 315; Hughes and Cresswell (1968), p. 301; Hintikka (1971), pp. 79-81; 
Lorenzen (1969), p. 70. 
Cf. yon Wright (1963), pp. 25-27, 36, 130-34. In this last passage von Wright seems to 
be aware of the problem. 
This criticism seems not to have occured to most authors on the subject. The only 
exceptions we have found are Ernst Mally and some of his followers. Cf. Mally (1926, 
1971), pp. 16-20 (J. Mokre's introduction), 231 ff. An extensive bibliography on this 
subject can be found in Hilpinen (1971), pp. 31-34. Mally, however, had the serious 
drawback of missing a clear idea of the formalization of strict implication. He treats, 
e.g., the formula (Op'pl ~ q)~ ~Oq, as logically valid (Mally, p. 18). By mistakes like 
these, he arrives at a useless formalism, which is eagerly asc~'ibed to his alleged wrong 
philosophical starting point, e.g., by Fr and Hilpinen, in Hilpinen (1971), pp. 
2-4. From our point of view, his philosophical point of departure seems correct but 
mistakes of a technical nature lead him astray again. In their comments on Mally's 
followers F & H tend to reject the good with the bad. Indeed some of them make the 
same technical mistakes as Mally, like A. Hofstadter and J. McKinsey (1939). Others, 
like K. Menger (1934), J. JCrgensen (1937) and A. Ross (1941), try to avoid the problems 
in a semantical way, either in the sense of a many valued interpretation (Menger) or of an 
interpretation without ruth values. The system introduced by Kurt Grelling (1939) seems 
to avoid Mally's mistakes without change of interpretation, but his system is rather 
clumsy. 
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6. "State of affairs" is a somewhat ambiguous term in this respect, because it can mean 
both a certain connection of characteristics and the actual existence of that connection. 
Even if - as is done in this paper - the first meaning is chosen, an inkling of the second 
remains present. This may be confusing when the same connection of characteristics is 
considered in a normative context. If a "state of affairs" is considered as a possible 
content of a decision, it proves rather difficult to abstract from the inkling of existence 
involved in this expression. This sometimes leads to the confusion of a decision with its 
realization and along this line the confusion of a logic of decision with a logic of action. 
7. Gottlob Grege (1891), p. 132, who introduced this distinction in mathematical logic, 
found that he had made it impossible to express judgment by considering certain 
mathematical ssertions as mathematical objects in order to identify predicate-notions 
with truth-functions. Therefore he had to introduce the assertion-symbol, which looks 
like the only predicate in his system that is not a function. In later developments of
mathematical logic, assertion was considered as a metamathematical or epitheoretical 
notion and it was given a semantical as well as a syntactical sense. Therefore it is 
inappropriate to identify sentences in mathematical logic with assertions or judgments; 
they represent connections about which assertions can be made on a metamathematical 
level. Cf. H.B. Curry (1963), chs. 2 and 3. 
8. A proposition is usually considered as an expression of a state of affairs, no matter how 
this state comes into existence, ither by processes of nature or by human action or in any 
other way. On the other hand, obligation and permissibility seem to apply to human 
action or its results, Yet it is not possible to restrict proposition-variables in deontic logic 
to propositions expressing human action or results of these, because this deprives us of 
the possibility to express conditional obligations like " I  ought to take my umbrella if it 
rains". 
9. Cf. yon Wright (1963), chs. 1, 5, 8, 9; Anderson (1966), pp. 171 ft., 196 ft.; A. Soeteman 
(1973). 
10. The objection could be made that, in the practical interpretation, "1-" should mean 
decision and that it is very well possible to decide for a norm and against its application. 
One could reply that it is equally possible to assert a law and deny its application. But 
that this would be an inconsequence is precisely the content of the axiom of necessity. So 
its deontic counterpart states that adopting a norm and refusing its application is 
incontinence. Just as the theses of theoretical logic express the integrity of thought, so 
the theses of deontic logic express the integrity of the will. 
11. Just as in ordinary propositional calculus, material implication represents in the 
formalism what deducability expresses fo r  the formalism. This fact is expressed by the 
rule of modus ponens in one direction and by the deduction theorem in the other. 
12. The term "epitheory" is introduced by Curry (1963), ch. 3. 
13. In the semantical theory of propositional calculus, a formula is defined to be valid iff it is 
true for "al l" valuations: 
a i f fVw. 'w(a)  = T 
But what is to be understood by "al l" valuations depends on the interpretations of the 
epitheory. We can express this fact by introducing this ir/terpretation explicitly by the 
name of w o. We can formulate this as follows: 
w o(~a)  = T i f f  w o (Vw:w(a)  =T)  = T 
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If the w belongs to a fixed universe of which also w o is a member, and the interpretation 
of the universal quantor under w o is determined by a special relation R of its arguments 
with respect o w o, we can reformulate this as follows: 
w o(~a)  = T i f fVw. 'woRw- ,  w(a) = T 
Which is equ[val-ent to r te  modal-semantical ru e for L (H & C, p. 73): 
w o (La) = T i f f  Vw.'woRw ~ w(a) = T 
This construction may seem somewhat artificial, but this is due to the fact that the 
interpretation of epitheoretical formulas (like ~ a) is usually considered to be fixed. In 
modal logic this point of view is expressed by the system $5, where R is an equivalence 
relation. The nivellation of "epivaluations" and valuations into one universe is the 
semantical counterpart of the inclusion of an originally epitheoretical notion in a 
formalism. 
14. I.e., the "assertion" predicate; cf. Curry (1963). 
15. In H & C's semantics, necessity means truth for all possible worlds under consideration 
from the point of view from which the necessity is evaluated. 
16. This looks like a "subjectivistic" interpretation, which it is not, in the sense that logical 
validity is not based on subjective decision. Integrity is obligatory for an acting subject as 
such. This is the absolute presupposition of all ethical relativism. 
17. As far as I know! Yet the content of the proposition "it rains here and now" can of 
course be considered. It can be asserted under certain conditions; it can also be assented 
to under certain conditions. Usually we do not assert it to be necessary or decide it to be 
obligatory unless in a relative context, e.g., with respect o a certain factual context or 
with respect to certain actions to be undertaken, for which it is a necessary condition. " I t  
rains" can even be the content of a decision, e.g., in telling a story. Of course such a 
logically contingent proposition can in no interpretation be a logical thesis, although it 
can fo rm part o f  such a thesis, e.g., " It  rains here and now, or it doesn't".  Neither 
thought nor will can have a content hat constitutes a third possibility. At least if one 
adheres to the strict "classical" meaning of negation. 
18. Von Wright (1969), p. 93. 
19. Cf. Kanger (1950), in Hilpinen (1971), p. 19. 
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